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Panjwayi Alamo

The Defence of Strongpoint Mushan
Sean M. Maloney

T

hroughout 2008, a small band of
Canadians living and working
alongside soldiers of the Afghan
National Army (ANA) occupied an
isolated outpost in Panjwayi district
designated Strongpoint Mushan.
Once the pivotal leg of an ambitious
security and development plan,
Strongpoint Mushan quickly became
an orphan as priorities changed,
the plan shifted, and the weight of
available friendly forces moved to
the eastern part of the district. At the
same time, abandoning Strongpoint
Mushan after such a lengthy
occupation would not only result in
a Taliban propaganda victory, but
would also remove the only coalition
presence in that part of Panjwayi, a
presence that was aggravating the
Taliban leadership in its attempts to
challenge Canada and Afghanistan
for control of the vital districts
west of Kandahar City. There was
no good solution to this dilemma,
so the position was kept manned
and resupplied in an increasingly
dangerous environment, even when
it was cut off on the ground. This is
the story of the Canadian soldiers of
the Operational Mentor and Liaison
Teams (OMLT) and the Afghan
soldiers they worked with in the
defence of Strongpoint Mushan.1

Why Mushan?

M

ushan is geographically
important to coalition efforts
west of Kandahar City. Looking

Abstract: The future of Afghanistan
rests in the country’s ability to field
effective national security forces.
Canada has played a significant role in
mentoring the Afghan National Army
(ANA) since 2003. By 2008, the ANA
was operating in battalion strength
in Kandahar province. Strongpoint
Mushan was a vital position that
interfered with enemy activity in
the region and the men from the
Operational Mentoring and Liaison
Team and their Afghan counterparts
held that ground in the face of vast
amounts of firepower directed at their
positions.

at a map, the embattled triangular
Zharey district lies south of Ring
Road South (Highway 1), the main
International Security Assistance
Force (ISAF) service route to the
forces fighting in Helmand province
and the primary commerce artery in
and through Afghanistan. Panjwayi
district, also triangular in shape, lies
to the south of Zharey district, with
the Arghandab River separating the
two. The forbidding Registan Desert
is directly south of Panjwayi district,
with the Dowry River separating
the two. The tapered western point
of Panjwayi district marks the
confluence of the Arghandab and
Dowry rivers – it is also the meeting
place of Zharey, Panjwayi, and the
Band-e Timor communities from
Maywand district. Maywand leads to
the Helmand river valley, and routes
from that region branch to Baram Cha
in Pakistan (see map on next page).
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The enemy needed to facilitate
the movement of enemy personnel,
supplies and weapons from Baram
Cha–Helmand Valley–Maywand into
Panjwayi. Once in Panjwayi, there are
other routes that lead into both the
southwest suburbs of Kandahar City
and to the “rocket box” northwest of
Kandahar Air Field where 107 mm
rockets are fired at this vital ISAF
logistics and support facility. This
route is also one of several used by
those engaged in the transport of
narcotics to Pakistan. A strongpoint
at Mushan is extremely inconvenient
for the Taliban, the Hezb-e-Islami
Gulbuddin (HiG) and other antigovernment and criminal elements.
In 2006, Mushan was quiet as the
Operation Medusa battles raged in
Pashmul and Sperwan Ghar. It was
widely believed that the “police”
presence in Mushan at that time was
really a militia belonging to elements
in the provincial power structure that
had some relationship to the narcotics
trade. Mushan was important to them
as product could not move along
Ring Road South or through Zharey
district because of the fighting that
raged there throughout the year.
In mid-2007, Task Force Kandahar
(TFK) formulated a plan to construct a
road from Panjwayi town to Mushan,
and then another from Mushan to
Ring Road South. In general the
idea was to facilitate commerce and
security in this extremely fertile
district. Mushan was the pivot for this
project and its enhanced stature in
the plan resulted in the construction
47
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of better defensive facilities there.
In time, Afghan National Police
replaced the local “police,” the
defensive works were designated a
“police sub-station” and a National
Directorate of Security detachment
moved in. This in turn increased
enemy interest in Mushan which was
demonstrated by a significant rise in
insurgent violence in the western part
of Panjwayi district. Subsequently the
decision was made to designate the
police sub-station as a strongpoint
and then deploy Afghan National
Army troops to Mushan.
In early 2008, Strongpoint
Mushan was one of a line of police
sub-stations and strongpoints
along the Panjwayi-Mushan road.
Enemy forces mounted a campaign
against this chain of facilities, which
escalated throughout the spring
of 2008. Mechanized forces had to
be used to resupply and replace
personnel along this chain which
in turn attracted enemy Improvised
Explosives Device (IED) cells. The
battle along the Panjwayi-Mushan
road nearly became a sub-campaign
unto itself partly because the absence
of Canadian helicopters forced TFK
48
https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol18/iss3/7

Maloney - Panjwayi Alamo.indd 48

to mount costly ground resupply
operations. There were no fewer
than 14 IED attacks directed against
Canadian vehicles during this period.
Eventually, the decision was made to
cease ground resupply and a variety
of aerial solutions were explored,
including the use of contracted
civilian Mi-8 helicopters.
The situation also resulted in
the redeployment of forces away
from some of the police sub-stations
along the Mushan-Panjwayi road
which added to the physical
and psychological isolation of
Strongpoint Mushan. There were
higher level considerations. The
Canadian government was a minority
government anticipating an election
campaign some time in 2008 in which
the costly commitment to Afghanistan
would undoubtedly be an issue. Any
enemy analysis of Canadian media
would have concluded that casualties
inflicted against Canadian forces
would have a strategic effect on
Canada’s commitment to a combat
role. At the same time, Canadian
and Afghan forces could not retreat
from Mushan for operational and
psychological reasons. These factors

collided in the fight over Mushan,
with the Canadian soldiers from the
OMLT and the Afghan soldiers from
the Kandaks caught in the middle.
Mushan had to hold.

The OMLT and the Kandaks

C

oalition soldiers have been used
to train the emergent Afghan
National Army since 2002. When
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF)
was the main coalition effort in
Afghanistan, Embedded Training
Teams (ETTs) were the primary
connection point between the ANA
and the coalition forces at the tactical
level. As NATO ISAF gradually
supplanted OEF and more non-North
American countries joined the effort,
new terminology emerged – the
Operational Mentor and Liaison
Team or OMLT.
The ETTs were similar to Vietnamera Special Forces A-Teams working
with non-professional indigenous
forces. Indeed, the burden of ETT
work initially fell on the 19th and 20th
Special Forces Groups in the early
days of the war. As the ANA emerged
2
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as an institution, the ETTs shifted to
a more conventional posture as the
intent was to create a professional
army to replace the Special Forcesbacked militias. A US National Guard
brigade took over this mission from
the special forces by 2004. The NATOled OMLTs were originally supposed
to supplement the OEF ETTs and
provide mentoring at brigade and
higher levels, but as NATO took
greater control of the coalition effort,
the NATO OMLTs increasingly
handled tasks previously done by
the ETTs. Confusingly, ETTs and
OMLTs shared the same battlespace
throughout Afghanistan.
Canada’s involvement with
mentoring at the tactical level dates
back to 2003-4 when a Canadian ETT
worked with ANA units in Kabul. At
that time, the Canadian ETT consisted
of 15 personnel led by a major who
worked closely with a “kandak,” the
ANA equivalent of a battalion. That
commitment evolved into significant
Canadian involvement with the
Kabul Military Training Centre
from 2003 to 2006, where Canadians
worked alongside American, French
and British soldiers and their Afghan
counterparts to raise, train, and equip
the kandaks that would form the
manoeuvre forces of the ANA.
For a variety of reasons related
to the deterioration of the situation
in Kandahar province, Canada
committed more resources to the
expansion of OMLTs in the fall of
2006. By this time 205 ANA Corps
was stood up and the kandaks
assigned to operations in Regional
Command South came under its
control. 1st Brigade of 205 Corps, or
1/205 Brigade, was established by

2007 to handle ANA operations in
the province. 1/205 Brigade’s kandaks
varied in number, however, and it
would be a mistake to assume that
1/205 Brigade had the same level
of stability that a Canadian brigade
has. In 2006, it wavered between
one and three kandaks. At that time
the Canadian OMLT was capable of
mentoring a single kandak.
T h e O M LT r e q u i r e m e n t s
increased dramatically in 2007, to
the point where nearly an entire
Canadian infantry battalion was
required to reorganize into OMLTs
to mentor the various components of
1/205 Brigade. 3rd Battalion, Princess
Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry,
an organization whose soldiers
and officers had on average two
tours in Afghanistan, was selected.
3 PPCLI was the first Canadian
infantry battalion to have any
contact with Afghans back in 2002.
Subsequently, “B” Company was
the force protection company for
the Provincial Reconstruction Team
when it was first established in
2005. In other words, these soldiers
h a d e x p e r i e n c e wo r k i n g w i t h
Afghans, and specifically Afghans
from Kandahar province, in nontraditional situations.
In 2008, 1/205 Brigade consisted
of five kandaks totalling, on a good
day, around 2,900 personnel. There

were three infantry kandaks 1/1, 1/2
and 1/3, a combat support kandak
(4/1) and a combat service support
kandak (5/1). For transport, each
kandak had a varying number of Ford
Ranger pickup trucks, Hummers
armed with 12.7 mm machine guns,
and International 7-ton trucks. Paper
organizational charts are, however,
deceiving when dealing with Afghan
units. In general, not all three infantry
kandaks were deployed at once.
Some were undergoing refit, others
had personnel on leave. There were
always a percentage of personnel
absent without leave for reasons
that cannot always be attributed to
shirking of duty. Local conditions
meant that it could take days for
soldiers on leave just to get home.
The CS and CSS kandaks at this
point were not fully manned nor
were the more specialized trades
like engineers and logisticians fully
trained.

Introducing 1/1 Kandak and
the Kandak 1/1/205 OMLT
Team 2

T

he Kandak assigned to Zharey
district in the spring and
summer of 2008 was 1/1 Kandak,
commanded by Colonel Anwar.
1/1 had three infantry companies,

Brigadier -General Gul Aqa Nibi,
commander of 205 Corp (Kandak 2-1205) Afghan National Army, gives an
interview to Canadian reporters after
the Transfer of Command Authority
Ceremony held at Joint Task Force
Afghanistan HQ, Kandahar Airfield,
Afghanistan, 11 May 2008.
Photo by Corporal S.J. McNeil, Canadian Forces Joint Imagery Centre (CFJIC) AR2008-M005-06
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A Canadian soldier assigned to the OMLT (Operational
Mentoring and Liaison Team) on sentry duty at a strongpoint
operated jointly by Canadian and Afghan soldiers.

each of about 70 men; a weapons
company of 188 personnel divided
into four platoons; a headquarters
and headquarters company and a
combat service support company of
around 70 men. 1/1 and its support
companies were based out of Forward
Operating Base (FOB) Masum’Ghar,
with two companies deployed to
FOB Sperwan Ghar and another
to Strongpoint Mushan. Three of
the weapons company platoons
occupied strongpoints along the
Panjwayi-Mushan road. 1/1 Kandak’s
leadership included a tactically
and politically proficient executive
officer who kept things together.
1/1 Kandak’s strength lay in its noncommissioned officers (NCOs) and
their regimental sergeant-major
(RSM). The operations sergeant and
company sergeants-major were rated
as strong. Their officers, however,
50
https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol18/iss3/7

Maloney - Panjwayi Alamo.indd 50

were generally weak. They suffered
from poor French training in Kabul
and some were appointed because of
political or tribal relationships. The
OMLT constantly strove to present to
the Afghans a national outlook. That
said, an estimated 60 percent of 1/1
was Pashtun, and Uzbeks dominated
the other 40 percent. Dari was the
language of choice, with Pashtun
used informally. Notably, the NCOs
publicly declared that “We are one
Army” and generally did not engage
in divisive ethnicity issues.
1/1 Kandak was fairly
experienced. It was formed in Kabul
back in 2002 where it initially acted
as part of President Hamid Karzai’s
protection force. 1/1 spent a lot
of time projecting from Kabul to
provinces in Regional Command East
when a surge was required. In 2005 it
was sent to Oruzgan province, where

it worked with a Dutch OMLT and
an American ETT. While in Oruzgan,
1/1 focused on becoming proficient
at platoon-level operations. Two
companies of 1/1 were deployed to
retake the Chora District Centre in
an action that took place in 2007. This
required what was euphemistically
called “heavy mentoring” by the
ETT and the Dutch OMLT. It was not
proficient at independent kandaklevel operations when it re-deployed
to Kandahar in November 2007. 1/1
entered the line in Panjwayi district
in late February 2008.
The Canadian OMLT paralleled
the kandak structure. Kandak 1/1/205
OMLT Team, as it was formally
known, was commanded initially by
Major Mark Campbell (until he was
critically wounded in June and then
replaced by Major David Proctor) and
consisted of 26 Canadian soldiers.
4
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Right: A Canadian sergeant of the
Operation Mentor and Liaison Team
(OMLT) (right) comes back from an
operation with Canadian and Afghan
soldiers.

Sixteen of these were the company
mentors, with each team consisting
of four men and an RG-31 Nyala
armoured vehicle: their callsigns were
71A through 71D. The OMLT also had
a five-man command post with an
RG-31 armoured patrol vehicle and
an eight-wheeled Bison, callsign 71.
There were three specialized mentors
(logistics, medical, and operations)
and a sergeant-major mentor. Each
company team consisted of a captain,
a warrant officer, and two corporals
or privates. However, the leave
plan and field injuries meant that
on many occasions the four-man
teams could be reduced to one or
two men. Similarly, not all of the
vehicles were operational as the
OMLT had no integral electrical and
mechanical engineering support
and could not always draw on other
Canadian resources, especially if 1/1
Kandak was operating away from
the Canadian battlegroup. In effect,
a skeletal Canadian light infantry
company mentored a motorized
Afghan kandak that was operating
in a static role.
Working with Afghan soldiers
was an eye-opening experience to
Canadian soldiers trained in the
context of Western culture and a
European-based military system.
The ANA had uniforms, most of
which were various versions of
the American woodland pattern
battledress, and wore different
coloured berets. All the men had
helmets and 95 percent had body
armour in the infantry companies
though bravado discouraged them
from wearing the protective gear.
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2009
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Below right: An OMLT RG-31 Nyala light
armoured vehicle parks in front of a line
of Afghan National Army Ford Ranger
trucks mounting 12.7 mm machine
guns at a leaguer near the village of
Nakhonay, in the Panjawai district.

Chest rigs predominated instead of
traditional webbing.
Culturally, the Afghan troops
were uneducated reflecting what
had happened to the country over
the past 20 years. The mentors noted
problems with learning, problem
solving, and abstract thinking.
The Afghan soldiers had difficulty
conceptualizing second and third
order effects, but more importantly
many had trouble associating ground
with its depiction on a map. Math
skills were limited. “The planning
cycle,” as one mentor explained, “was
moment to moment.” Again, this was
not surprising since the young men
emerged from a survivalist culture
where life expectancy was short and
the Taliban discouraged the study of
anything other than the Koran.

T h e A f g h a n s o l d i e r s we r e
extremely polite and respectful of
elders. They understood “place”and
rank, and tended to be nonconfrontational. They would go
out of their way not to humiliate
guests in any way, as hospitality
was a cornerstone of not only the
Pashtunwali code, but of Afghan
society generally. Their faith was an
integral aspect of their daily lives,
to the point where it could interfere
with operations. Soldiers would pray
collectively before, after, and even
during patrols – a sentry would be
deployed as the prayer mats were
pulled out.
For the most part, the Afghan
soldiers understood the basics and
they could work as a team. The main
problems lay in planning, combat
service support, and their tendency
51
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This picture, taken from a Canadian CH-47 Chinook and facing west, shows the confluence of the Arghandab and Dowry Rivers
where the Reg Desert, Maywand district, Zharey District, and western Panjwayi District meet. Mushan is indicated by an arrow.
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resistance. By the end of March 1/1
Kandak had a company in Mushan,
another in and around Panjwayi town
and bazaar, and another deployed
up at a district centre in Ghorak. The
kandak and its mentors initiated
a patrolling programme along the
Panjwayi-Mushan road, but with
the lack of police in these locations,
the best the teams could provide
was a temporary day-time presence.
A n o t h e r t a s k wa s t o p r o v i d e
overwatch security to the PanjwayiMushan road paving project that
had just started near Panjwayi town.
On occasion, coalition operations
damaged property in the battle area.
As the kandak and the OMLT had no
integral Civil-Military Cooperation
(CIMIC) capability, they also sent out
assessment patrols to note damage

and pass the information back to
the CIMIC teams at the Provincial
Reconstruction Team.

Mushan: Environs,
Occupants, and Initial
Operations

T

he strongpoint itself is located
two kilometres east of Mushan
village, next to the unpaved road.
The Mushan Bazaar is approximately
300 metres northwest of the position.
On market days the bazaar, which
is the economic centre for the area,
swells to 400 people. Just south of
the bazaar is a building that used to
be used as a clinic. A small Kutchi3
camp is situated to the northeast.
For the most part, the terrain is flat
6
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to be reactive. The danger in any
OMLT was that the mentors would
take over the problem-solving tasks
and the teams had to be vigilant in
passing on this responsibility to the
Afghan leaders. Clearly, there was no
impetus to improve if the Canadians
did everything for them. The Afghan
NCOs did lead by example and that
was considered to be a major positive
factor.
The war around Mushan in early
2008 revolved around efforts to affect
a relief-in-place (RIP) of the forces
stationed in Mushan. The outgoing
OMLT and ANA company from
another kandak was replaced with
a new rotation in early March. This
was a complex operation involving
a strong mechanized force that
encountered significant enemy
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and consists of traditional Afghan
compound complexes with high mud
walls, grape growing trenches, grape
drying huts, and walled growing
areas for the crops.
Strongpoint Mushan is 100
metres by 150 metres square. The
main wall is made from Hescobastion
and has two observation towers:
one to the north, the other south.
There are three run-up positions
used by Ford Ranger vehicles with
DsHkA and PKM machine guns
mounted on them. A pit with a 60
mm mortar occupies the centre.
It has no air conditioning and is
infested with sand fleas and ugly
camel spiders. The ANA and the
OMLT lived in modular tents, but
there were several bunkers which
consisted of a layer of sandbags,
one man high. Concertina wire
surrounded the perimeter, backed up
with Claymore area defence weapons.
ANA strength varied between 62 and
68, amounting to two platoons. The

ANA company at Mushan had a mix
of PKM, DshKa, KpV 14.7 mm, and
.50 cal machine guns augmented
with RPG-7 rocket launchers. The
first OMLT team into Mushan4 was
71B, led by Captain Craig Robertson,
and included Warrant Officer Rob
Crane, Corporal “Rusty” Myroniuk,
and Corporal Shaun Copeland.
Generally, the Canadian OMLT team
had three to four personnel stationed
at Mushan. The OMLT personnel had
their personal weapons, plus a Carl
Gustav rocket launcher and M203
grenade launcher attachments for
their weapons.
For the most part, the platoons
at Mushan ranged out three to four
kilometres from the strongpoint.
These “framework” patrols in and
around Mushan and the bazaar
produced significant information on
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2009
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the insurgent activities through Key
Leader Engagements (KLEs) and by
casual contact with the population.
The Afghan soldiers, being more
conversant with local culture than
Canadians, had insight into the
situation that an array of technical
collection means could not match.
For example, around 7 March, an
ANA company commander held
an impromptu shura at the bazaar.
The local merchants told him that
the enemy would mount significant
operations against the strongpoint
in a month’s time. The merchants
were upset by this development
and asked the Taliban to stay away
from Mushan. This information was
confirmed by a follow-up patrol. The
remains of two failed 107 mm rocket
launches, discovered on separate
patrols, pointed towards a higher
probability of future enemy action.
The locals within the three to
four kilometre security “bubble”
around the strongpoint were

generally apathetic but at the same
time expressed positive sentiments
about the ANA’s presence. Whoever
was in charge, or appeared to be in
charge, they would back. They were
caught between the insurgents and
the Afghan government and in effect
determined that in Mushan it was too
risky to take a position. It was easier
to do nothing and just carry on with
day-to-day life.
Further patrolling and KLEs
started to flesh out information about
the enemy. There was a spotter or
facilitator close to the strongpoint,
and an estimated 12-15 insurgents
within Mushan itself. Information
suggested that the regular patrolling
had a deterrent effect on this cell’s
operations, that they were somewhat
frustrated, and wanted help. They
were particularly concerned about
the coalition presence at the bazaar
for unknown reasons. A week
later, two men who were
evidently monitoring the

A US Army OH-58D Kiowa Warrior in Afghanistan.
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Canadian soldiers of the OMLT and Afghan National Army soldiers walk through a
poppy field during an operation in the Panjwayi district, Afghanistan, 1 May 2008.

54
https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol18/iss3/7

Maloney - Panjwayi Alamo.indd 54

Cavalry (“The Banshees”) arrived
on the scene. Using the splash of the
grenades as a marker, the helicopters
made six runs on the target firing .50
cal machine guns and rocket pods
as the ANA kept the enemy pinned
down. Enemy firing ceased and,
because the ANA patrol was critically
short of ammunition, it withdrew
while covered by an MQ-1 Predator
UAV. One suspected insurgent was
apprehended by a hastily-established
vehicle check point and three enemy
were seen to flee from the engagement
in the direction of a Kutchi camp
located near the Reg desert. Follow
up KLEs suggested that the locals
were concerned about the unusual
increase in insurgent activity around
Mushan.
Notably, the ANA started to bring
Afghan National Police (ANP) along
with them during search operations,

There was, however, a striking
difference in the professionalism of
the two forces. On one joint patrol,
the ANA were appalled by the
police behaviour towards women
and lack of respect for property. The
discussion between the two forces
became quite vocal on one occasion.
At the beginning of April, the
coalition mounted Operation Toor
Azadi along Route Fosters. Toor
Azadi was designed to resupply
all of the police sub-stations and
strongpoints and conduct a RIP
for individuals and sub-units. 3rd
Company was supposed to be part of
this RIP. 71B and the ANA extended
patrols to the east of Mushan as
part of this effort. Unfortunately, as
vehicle casualties mounted from IED
attacks, the force halted to the east
less than half way to Mushan. On 3
April, the link up between the forces

Photo taken by author

movements of a patrol were detained.
ISTAR reports about enemy interest
in Strongpoint Mushan’s activities
started to pick up in the area around
mid-March.
71B and the 3rd Company soldiers
then had a contact on 25 March three
kilometres south of the strongpoint.
Five insurgents armed with a PKM
machine gun engaged the patrol
from a compound. When the ANA
deployed and fired back, the enemy
withdrew. The Afghans caught a man
who had enemy logistics documents
in his possession. The following day,
another ANA patrol and 71B were
engaged by what was believed to
be ten insurgents firing RPGs and
PKMs from behind walls and a grapedrying hut. During the 40-minute
firefight, 71B fired M203 grenade
launchers at the hut as a pair of
OH-58Ds from Company “B” 2-17

8
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occurred and 71A, consisting of
Captain Matt Aggus, Warrant Officer
John McNabb and Master Corporal
Trevor Saina replaced 71B, while 3rd
Company RIP’d with 1st Company.
The team and its Afghan
counterparts mounted daily
framework patrols and compound
searches throughout April.
Intelligence revealed that the enemy
was annoyed at the continued
presence of the force and planned
to bring a mortar into the area but
their logistics system was having
problems deploying the weapon and
its ammunition.
Resupply was a significant
problem for the men occupying
Strongpoint Mushan. The American
and British transport helicopters
supporting operations in Regional
Command (South) would not fly in
to Mushan unless they had AH-64
Apache support. The operational
tempo in RC(S) in the spring and
summer of 2008 meant that there
were few AH-64s available for
a mundane resupply task. The
Helicopter Landing
Site at

Mushan was exposed and subject
to dust clouds, which were hard
on helicopter engines. Emergency
resupply became the order of the day,
with food, water and ammo kicked
out the doors of helicopters when
they were available. Consideration
was given to using C-130 Hercules
from the multi-national pool to
conduct parachute resupply
drops using GPS-guided pallets,
but instead the decision was
made to use “Jingle Air,”
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2009
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civilian contractor-flown Mi-8 HIP
helicopters, to resupply the combat
outposts and strongpoints. One
“Jingle Air” HIP dropped its load in a
panic when confronted with a volley
of RPGs on approach to another
combat outpost. The enemy set an
ambush which deterred recovery
of the supplies, and then raided the
pallet and exploited the contents of
the mail bag for PSYOPS purposes
against the Canadians manning the
outpost.
After this debacle, aerial resupply
of the strongpoints along FOSTERS
was limited to the “emergency AMR”
– a US Army UH-60 from Task Force
Eagle Assault, escorted by a pair of
OH-58D Kiowa Warriors from The
Banshees (if AH-64 Apaches were
unavailable as was usually the case),
would land at the Mushan helicopter
landing site, the crew chief would
kick out boxes of ammo, and the
Blackhawk would immediately
lift
off covered by the

o r b i t i n g
OH‑58Ds.
When OMLT
personnel had their
mid-tour leave, they
had to be escorted by a
foot patrol east to the police
sub-station at Talukan. This
became a staple of life at
Mushan when 71B came back in to
replace 71A in mid-April. The 71B
team instituted night patrolling in the
area in order to increase the ANA’s
proficiency at that art. This produced
results in the ISTAR system, so more
and more patrols were mounted as
part of a “manouvre to collect”
programme designed to flesh
out the size and intentions of
the enemy apparatus in and
around Mushan. As patrolling
became more regular around

the bazaar, enemy forces from
across the river in Zharey started to
engage from a distance. The mentors
recommended that the patrol plan
include those areas, but the ANA
company commander was reluctant
to do so without air support so for
the rest of April patrols focused on
the bazaar and areas west of the town.
In May, the 71A team, consisting
of Aggus, McNabb, Saina and
Corporal Dan Meeking, a medic who
was attached from the Police OMLT,
replaced 71B at Mushan during
Operation Toor Azadi II. (Corporal
Tyler Latta arrived back from leave
later on and Meeking rotated out).
There was an immediate spike in
reports of unarmed enemy personnel
observing this RIP operation, but
again there was little enemy activity
with the exception of an IED attack
against a patrol from “B” Company, 2
PPCLI, an ANA section, and mentors
from 71A. This was a particularly
gruesome attack in which the enemy
used a ten-year-old boy to carry
the explosives. This child was
pushed ahead by an
older man in the direction
of the patrol, and then remotely
detonated. The attack killed an ANA
soldier and wounded two Canadians
and one Afghan.5
By this time preparations for
Operation Nolai was in progress. This
was a 2 PPCLI battlegroup operation
in Zharey district which was designed
to move south from Ring Road
South towards Mushan. The Mushan
force was to play a supporting role
by providing a feint to the south.
On 26 May, however, a number of
insurgents shot at an ANA patrol
(accompanied by Warrant Officer
John McNabb) from a compound.
The Afghans mounted a clearance
operation with “minimal prompting”
Contracted Mi-8s and Mi-17s flown by
pilots from the former Soviet Union
flew resupply missions to Strongpoint
Mushan
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in with an M-72 LAW and a M203
grenade launcher. An enemy sniper
then started to pick away at the
Afghans who had gone to ground in
a nearby wadi. The two M-777 guns
from “C” Troop, “B” Battery, 1 RCHA
under the command of Lieutenant
Candice Dunn (who later became
known as “The Angel of Death” by
the some of the soldiers her troop was
supporting) fired smoke to screen
the ANA as they broke contact, leapfrogging back in good order in two
groups. ISTAR reports indicated that
a Taliban cell leader and five other
insurgents were killed during the
course of these engagements. They
were attempting their own version
of a Key Leader Engagement at the
time the patrol appeared.
The next day, several mortar
rounds landed near the strongpoint.

The Sperwan Ghar M-777s fired
several smoke missions to screen
the compound from any potential
observers or mortar fire controllers.
Subsequently an insurgent
commander told the shopkeepers at
the Mushan bazaar to close up and go
home because “the war has started.”

The Defence of
Strongpoint Mushan

T

he number of engagements
from the north bank of the river
continued to mount in early June. In
almost every case a patrol that was
involved in a “Troops in Contact”
(TIC) event was mortared once it
returned to the strongpoint. None of
these rounds initially made their way
into the compound, but incoming

Map drawn by Mike Bechthold ©2009

and their leadership retained a “cool
demeanour” during the engagement.
The enemy fled north into Zharey
with “B” Company supported by
an MQ-1 Predator in close pursuit.
Within two days, the insurgents
attacked the strongpoint with small
arms fire from the direction of the old
clinic.
The situation around Mushan
deteriorated again on 31 May. Between
15 and 20 insurgents split between
four compounds ambushed a 20-man
Afghan patrol and three Canadian
mentors in a three-sided ambush,
while the strongpoint simultaneously
received harassing sniper fire. The
ANA patrol endured ten minutes of
small arms and RPG fire before the
patrol sergeant organized his PKM
machine guns to respond during a
lull in the fire. The mentors joined
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: Panjwayi Alamo The Defence of Strongpoint Mushan
rounds were seen to bracket it 100
metres in each direction. This was an
indicator that a trained enemy mortar
fire controller was present in the area.
Between 8 and 10 June, ISTAR
reports indicated that the enemy
was annoyed at what they perceived
to be the pro-government tilt of the
population in Mushan and intended
to go into the bazaar and intimidate
the merchants. One theory was
that the intended second order
effect was to have merchants stop
selling fresh food to the ANA in the
strongpoint in order to aggravate
the supply situation. A local source
complained to the Joint District
Coordination Centre in Panjwayi
about the intimidation.
As a result of this information, the
company in the strongpoint surged
two platoons into Mushan Bazaar
as a show of force to demonstrate to
the population that the government
would not be intimidated. As the
two cut-off groups deployed (see
map) they came under enemy fire.
One platoon, moving in behind the
bazaar, took rounds from a grape
hut to the west, while the second
platoon received small arms and RPG
fire from positions west of the old
clinic. A Canadian Sperwer Tactical
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (TUAV)
was orbiting the battle, and a pair of
US Air Force F-15s were available, but
there were problems in employing
the firepower because of the close
proximity of the engaged forces. The
firefights stalemated after about 30
minutes, and then the strongpoint
started taking fire. The Afghans in
the run-up position machine guns
were able to identify and engage one
of the compounds where the enemy
was shooting from, as did the platoon
near the bazaar. The enemy then
started to exfiltrate from the position
opposite the bazaar. Warrant Officer
John McNabb, who was not trained as
a forward air controller, contacted the
F-15s. The orbiting fighter-bombers
dropped two 500-pound bombs on

Photos from the top:
Orders group prior to Operation NO LAI
for 1st Company, 1 Kandak.
Captain Matt Aggus confers with his
Afghan counterpart during a cordon and
search operation.
Corporal Tyler Latta on patrol.
Warrant Officer Johnny McNabb and
Jack.

the hut and a 1000-pound bomb on
the old clinic. These strikes reduced
both structures to six-foot piles of
rubble. The M-777s from Sperwan
Ghar fired an additional five 155 mm
rounds to catch the enemy as they
withdrew.
The first platoon from the bazaar
then swept south to link up with
the second platoon at the old clinic,
where they found a lot of casings and
some salvage, but no bodies. Low on
ammo the decision was made to head
back to the strongpoint and call in a
casualty evacuation flight. Two Ford
Rangers loaded with ammo and led
by Sergeant Major Bashir sortied out
to the bazaar to act as a reserve as
the withdrawal took place. The F-15s
remained overhead as long as they
could.
ISTAR then reported that the
enemy was attempting to hide its
dead bodies and assorted body
parts in culverts so they could deny
the coalition forces a battle damage
estimate. These remains were to be
retrieved later. The enemy estimated
it sustained 15 killed in this action.
As the situation heated up
throughout June, a ground resupply
operation named ROOM SERVICE
was spun up by an armoured combat
team from “B” Squadron, The Lord
Strathcona’s Horse (Royal Canadians)
led by Major Chris Adams. This
particular “river run” brought in an
additional mentor and five more ANA
soldiers, just in time for Operation
NOLAI. The Mushan force’s role in
NOLAI was to cross the river with
a platoon and two mentors and then
distract enemy forces further north
right before they were attacked by
an infantry company from 2 PPCLI
and an infantry company from
another Kandak, all supported by the
Strathcona’s Leopard 2A6M tanks.
The Mushan force was ordered to not
get decisively engaged.
As the Afghans and Canadians
crossed the river bed into Zharey
district on the morning of 14 June, an

Photos courtesy of Tyler Latta & John McNabb
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Top: Operation ROOM SERVICE was the periodic Mushan resupply task executed by
the Strathcona’s tank squadron and other mechanized forces.
Middle: A newly-acquired Canadian Forces Leopard 2 main battle tank, moves through
a forward operating base in Zhari District, Southern Afghanistan, 25 October 2008. The
tanks are helping to provide support and protection for the battle group.
1st Company, 1st Kandak and it operational mentoring and liaison team on return to
FOB Masu’m Ghar.
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Afghan soldier spotted an insurgent
with an RPG in a compound. As the
platoon took up firing positions, the
enemy unleashed a high volume of
small arms fire against the coalition
forces from a grape field to the west.
An OH-58D from The Banshees,
already on station, swept up from the
river bed, but the communications
between the ground forces and
the helicopters were not working.
Corporal Tyler Latta jumped up onto
a wall and pointed in the direction of
the enemy so the Banshees could go
to work and .50 cal machine gun fire
raked the grape field. Then between
8 and 10 insurgents opened up from
covered positions to the north in a
tree line. The Afghans returned fire
that was inaccurate but voluminous.
Pumped on adrenalin, the RPG
gunners fired too high, arching their
rockets to no effect.
One of the other mentors,
Corporal Tyler Latta, fired M203
grenade rounds into the northern
tree line to mark the target, while
ISTAR reports confirmed that a force
of between 10 to 15 Taliban were in
the area. The OH-58D made multiple
gun runs on the tree line until it had
expended its ammunition. The snubnosed rocket pod was employed
until it too was out of rockets. This
engagement lasted 15 minutes. A
Canadian TUAV then spotted an
insurgent lugging an 82 mm recoilless
rifle heading north. An orbiting
MQ-9 Reaper subsequently ended
this threat by dropping a 500-pound
bomb.
The fire from the tree line dropped
off and the Afghans and their mentors
moved in, finding seven dead enemy.
Then two elders approached, but
some of the Afghans believed that
they were being used to plant false
information or worse trying to suck
the platoon into an ambush in the
compound complex to the northwest.
As the OH-58D was low on fuel, it
headed home. Once the helicopter
departed, five insurgents opened up
with small arms. The decision was
12
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of proximity-fused high explosive
rounds in the same area after he saw
three enemy moving in that area.
An Afghan soldier then spotted a
single insurgent and dispatched him
with an RPG round. The fight was on
as a five-man insurgent group then
opened up on the platoon. Lieutenant
Dawa Jan, who had been trying
to calm the panicked interpreter,
ordered the platoon to move back
to the south bank. As they moved
across, they saw that the Kutchi camp
on the south back was being packed
up and a trail of people were moving
to the west. This was not a good sign.
An ISTAR asset reported that there
were several non-Kutchi present,
some wearing black turbans, but
they appeared to be unarmed. As the
enemy fire resumed from the north
bank, Lieutenant Jan prepared to
move the platoon east along the river
when an Afghan soldier spotted men
with weapons on a wall paralleling
the river on the south bank. The
Sperwan Ghar M-777s fired a linear
smoke mission, followed by a high
explosive mission onto the wall.
The platoon dashed across the river
bed to secure the position. The wall,
however, was 25 feet high which
forced the platoon to continue east
once more, which produced a repeat
of the situation – the artillery fired
smoke but then the enemy opened
fire from the north bank. McNabb’s
helmet was knocked off by an RPG
blast, while Latta sought out an
extraction route. The guns fired a
linear HE mission down the river
bank in a bid to stop the fire. The
rounds “walked” down the north
side of river and had a noticeable
effect on the enemy’s aim.
As the platoon finally made
its way back to the strongpoint, it
came under ineffective fire from the
bazaar. The guns from Sperwan Ghar
now had to shift fire since combat
outposts elsewhere along FOSTERS
were under attack. An orbiting MQ-1
Predator spotted four insurgents 500

Photo courtesy Latta & McNabb

made to move back to the river bed
and hold, so a request for fire from the
1 RCHA M-777’s at Sperwan Ghar was
submitted. This mission could not be
executed. With the Afghans running
low on ammo, McNabb and Latta
decided to use their smoke grenades
to cover a withdrawal across the river
bed, as an Afghan section sortied
out from Mushan to the south bank
to assist. However, once the platoon
was back at Strongpoint Mushan,
three mortar rounds landed right
on the southwest edge of the wire.
Shrapnel hit an Afghan commander
in the shoulder and Captain Hyatt
was slightly wounded. The .50 cal
and C-6 machine guns in the towers
immediately opened up on the point
of origin using the “uneducated
guess” method. ISTAR reports
later estimated that 12 enemy were
killed during the course of the day’s
operations, all on the north bank of
the river.
On 15 June, a similar crossriver operation was mounted from
Mushan, but this time the entry
point was shifted 800 metres west.
Starting out at 0300 hours, the probe
ran into trouble immediately due to a
navigation error which put them 200
metres further west in an area that
had virtually no cover when the sun
came up at around 0430 hours. ISTAR
reports indicated that the enemy “just
went nuts” and ordered local forces
to observe and engage as rapidly as
possible. When this information was
relayed to the platoon, the interpreter
started to panic and started to urinate
every five minutes. Some of the ANA
soldiers started to panic too, which
put McNabb and Latta in a bind.
Knowing that panic is contagious
and must be countered immediately,
McNabb and Latta decided to have
the “C” Troop M-777’s drop some
smoke to the north of their location.
ISTAR reports told the platoon that
the enemy was worried about how
close the smoke was to their position,
so McNabb called in a fire mission

CFJIC LT2005-0526
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Photos from the top:
A Canadian Sperwer Tactical Unmanned
Aerial Vehicle ready for launch.
OMLT 71A at the end of the Mushan
operations: MCpl Trevor Saina, WO John
McNabb, MCpl Tyler Latta, Capt Matt
Aggus, Cpl Craig White.
MCpl Tyler Latta and WO John McNabb
at Strongpoint Mushan.
“The guys.”
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Troops In Contact (TICs) – Each pin represents a contact with enemy forces. The
top map shows the TICs for the OMLT in Panjwayi District, while the second shows
the TICs around Strongpoint Mushan for the same period.

metres away from Mushan preparing
to fire RPGs. They were successfully
engaged with a Hellfire missile.
Operation NOLAI disrupted
enemy harassing fire that was
being directed at patrols near the
bazaar in addition to the distraction
generated to support the 2 PPCLI
company operation. The heavy
60
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contacts during Op NOLAI, however,
left the company in Mushan low
on most supplies. While awaiting
resupply, the strongpoint and its
occupants were engaged in almost
daily gunfights throughout June.
The insurgents then mounted a bold
attack on 22 June. Machine gun fire
raked the strongpoint, while RPG

rockets were fired from the west.
The Canadian mentors and the ANA
responded with a high volume of
direct and indirect fire to ward off
the attackers. During the course of
the firefight, ISTAR reports indicated
that the enemy wanted to generate
casualties so that the coalition would
respond with a MEDEVAC helicopter,
which in turn was to be targeted for
destruction. After this engagement,
the enemy force in the Mushan area
ran short of ammunition which
slowed their operations for a time.
The next day, an ANA patrol
noted that women and children
were evacuating the area west of the
bazaar. This was an ominous sign.
Twenty-four hours later on 28 June,
RPG volleys, small arms and now
an 82 mm recoilless rifle poured fire
onto the strongpoint. The Canadian
mentors dragged out their Carl
Gustav and fired back with 84 mm
rocket-assisted projectiles. They also
bombarded the attackers with the 60
mm mortar and emptied box after
box of .50 cal ammunition as the
Afghans moved the Ford Rangers
into the run-ups and engaged with
12.7mm DshKa’s.
On 29 June, a smaller volume of
small arms fire was directed at the
Mushan force from a pair of grape
drying huts to the northwest. The
ANA returned fire. The next day
what appeared to be a coordinated
small arms attack from the northwest
and the south west was repelled. The
situation quieted down until 4 July
when an ANA patrol in the bazaar was
shot at and the strongpoint mortared.
The insurgents said “goodbye” to
1st Company and the 71A team with
a devastating mortar attack which
wounded five ANA soldiers, and
disabled the 60 mm mortar. One of
the wounded suffered a serious brain
injury, which was attended to by the
Canadian medic, Master Corporal
Ian Mothas. Almost all of the medical
supplies were used up. The severely
wounded Afghan soldier later died.
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and small arms fire, coming from both
banks of the river, was inaccurate.
The ANA stood and fought back as
artillery was requested. Sergeant
Abdul Haq, seeing an Afghan soldier
fire his machine gun in a jerky and
ineffective fashion, grabbed the
PKM, ran up and fired the weapon,
stunning and scattering part of the
ambush force. Then, in what has
to be the dumbest move in Taliban
military history, an insurgent armed
with an RPG ran onto the river bed
directly in front of a Leopard 2 and
tried to engage the tank. Two tank
commanders apparently argued
over who was going to take him out,
so both fired simultaneously and
vapourized the insurgent with 120
mm HEAT rounds before he could
fire his rocket launcher.
Meanwhile, back at Strongpoint
Mushan, Afghan National Army
patrols were engaged from Zharey
district any time they went near
the bazaar and the indirect fire
attacks continued. From 7 to 26
July, Strongpoint Mushan and its
occupants, now augmented to include
seven Canadian mentors, were
engaged on 14 separate occasions
with various combinations of small
arms fire, RPG attacks, and mortar
fire. In one of these engagements,
the strongpoint took several mortar
rounds, one of which landed two

Mortar Games
h e S t r a t h c o n a ’s L e o p a r d s
deployed again on 5 July during
Operation ROOM SERVICE 2 and
fought their way to Mushan, resulting
in multiple engagements along the
Arghandab River. 2nd Company
and the 71B team took over from
1st Company and 71A, who had
deployed into a “bubble” around
the strongpoint in order to receive
the column. 71B and 2nd Company
were greeted with a mortar attack
on 9 July, which produced two more
Afghan casualties and took out the
communications equipment. In this
attack, five mortar rounds were
fired from the vicinity of the clinic
and two hit inside the compound.
A subsequent fire destroyed the
accommodation tents and most of
the strongpoint’s stores. The 71B
commander, Captain Slade Lerch
requested that a Joint Terminal Air
Controller (JTAC) and other assets
be deployed to Strongpoint Mushan
to deal with the mortars.
On the return trip, the 71A team
and the ANA company was tucked
into the “bubble of steel” provided
by the tanks of the Operation ROOM
SERVICE column which snaked
its way back along the Arghandab
River towards Mas’um Ghar forward
operating base. 71A’s ordeal was
not over yet. The column was hit
by enemy fire and Captain Matt
Aggus dismounted with the Afghans
to engage the ambushers as the
Strathcona’s Leopard 2s returned fire
with their 120 mm guns. The enemy
fled. The column was hit again 600
metres further along but this time
the enemy focused on the ANA’s softskinned Rangers. The enemy RPG

An Afghan soldier has decorated his RPG
with flowers while he patrols through a
marijuana field in the Panjwayi district,
August 2008.

Photo by MCpl Karl McKay, CFJIC AR2008-K074-024
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metres from the mortar pit and its
ammo stash. Captain Lerch, using
his binoculars from one of the towers
and covered by Corporal Duarte
with a .50 cal machine gun, called
down corrections to Master Warrant
Officer Rod Dearing and Corporal
MacDonald, who were manning the
60 mm mortar. Corporal John Prior
fired the 25 mm from a LAV-III with
Master Corporal Todd Woods in the
other tower spotting. The next day
the insurgents held a funeral for
their mortar expert and credited the
“government mortar team” with the
kill. Several Afghan soldiers received
wounds and were medevaced by
UH-60s covered by Banshee OH58Ds. The Afghans and the mentors
maintained their rigorous patrol
schedule in the surrounding area.
Operation LEWE, a sweep by “B”
Company 2 PPCLI, was put together
to disrupt enemy activity and give
the strongpoint some breathing room.
Fighting patrols from 1st Company
and 71A, Weapons Company and
71D, and “B” Company fanned out
west of Mushan, which resulted in
several TICs but no mortars.
At the end of July, 2nd Company
and the 71B team returned to Mushan
on Operation ROOM SERVICE 3,
and Captain Aggus, Master Corporal
Saina and Corporal Latta returned.
While the RIP and resupply was
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A British RAF Chinook fires CHAFF
against a detected threat before
touching down at a 3 RCR battlegroup
forward operating base, 22 October
2008.

in progress, the enemy was bold
enough to engage the tank leaguer
with seven rounds of ineffective
mortar fire the first night. When
they tried it again the following
night, the mortar was engaged with
two 500-pound bombs from a pair
of US Marine Corps F-18s, while
insurgents manoeuvring to engage
on the ground were discouraged from
doing so by 120 mm gun fire from the
Leopard 2 tanks. An estimated five
insurgents were killed.
Once ensconced in the strongpoint
and the tanks had gone home with
the 71A team, the new occupants
were subjected to a coordinated
small arms direct fire and a mortar
attack, which resulted in two mortar
hits inside the compound and three
casualties. On 26 July, 71B and an
ANA patrol were engaged by a
section of insurgents. Patience had
worn thin and “C” Troop’s M-777’s
from Sperwan Ghar were called into
action to deal with the ambush. As
if in retaliation, five mortar rounds
were fired at the strongpoint the next
day, but this grouping was not as
accurate as previous attacks. None of
the rounds landed anywhere near the
compound. This attack was replicated
the following day, leading some to
speculate that a new mortar team was
now in play. Patrols found numerous
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duds in the ground around the
strongpoint and the ammunition was
determined to be of Iranian origin.
The enemy now resorted to a new
tactic. A delegation of people arrived
at the Joint District Coordination
Centre in Panjwayi town, and asked
for a shura, which was granted.
They petitioned the government to
have the strongpoint and its forces
removed. They asserted that crops
and compounds were damaged by
the various resupply operations and
they demanded restitution for the
damage. The problem was that this
delegation did not in fact represent
the people of Mushan at all and the
Afghans identified one man as a
relative of a known Taliban fighter.
When this approach did not
work, small arms attacks on the
strongpoint resumed on 14 August,
followed by two more mortar attacks
on 20 August. This time, an ISTAR
system was able to identify the point
of origin of the mortar attacks and
the M-777’s from Sperwan Ghar
blanketed the position with 155
mm rounds in an effort to kill the
mortar teams. What emerged later
was that an enemy mortar specialist
was brought in to replace the one
killed in a previous engagement.
This individual’s modus operandi
was different. He would establish

the mortar base plate, and sight
in the weapon. Other insurgents,
obviously more expendable than
“the specialist,” were used to fire
and reload the weapon while the
specialist left the mortar position
long before the counter-battery fire
arrived. As the counter-battery fire
improved and patrol programme
expanded the security “bubble,”
the enemy mortar specialist and his
apprentices were forced to move
north of the Arghandab River.

Relief In Place

A

fter its successful participation
in another incursion into Zharey
district, 1/1-205 Kandak and its
mentors were extracted from Mushan
and rotated back to Camp Hero
for refitting, training, and rest by
September 2008. Canadian engineers
deployed to the FOB Mushan and laid
“Rhino Snot” and Moby Matting to
improve the helipad. Canadian CH‑47
Chinook helicopters escorted by CH146 Griffons took over resupply
and RIP missions. A company from
2/2-205 “Strike” Kandak moved
into the FOB. Families started to
move back into the area at this time.
Captain Sahim Ravatullah personally
guaranteed that he and his men
would provide security to the area
during a shura held with the local
elders. Constant framework patrols
demonstrated his resolve over a twoweek “honeymoon” period.
By the end of October 2008,
relations between the local population
and the new ANA company were
improving. The Taliban, noting that
the bazaar was the nexus of this
improved relationship, established
a rival market three kilometres west
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of Mushan town with checkpoints
to protect it and used intimidation
patrols to demand that the locals
close the existing bazaar near the
FOB. Attendance at the regular bazaar
dropped 75 percent over the course of
one week but the ANA and the OMLT
responded by pushing out west of
the town. The Taliban’s response
was to resume harassing mortar fire
directed against FOB Mushan in late
November and even brought in one
of their scarce 82 mm recoilless rifles.
On 17 November three first round
hits eventually landed inside the
FOB, killing two and wounding four
Afghan soldiers, while other mortars
were fired towards Zangabad and
IEDs were laid on the road to the east
in order to discourage reinforcement.
Unlike the previous locations, the
new mortars were emplaced by
their teams inside houses and fired
through holes cut in the roof. Clearly,
any aerial retaliation which resulted
in destroyed buildings and dead
civilian “human shields” would
be exploited by the enemy and
condemned by the Western media.
ISTAR reports confirmed that this
was another professional team that
had infiltrated from Pakistan. As
US Army UH-60s conducted the
MEDEVAC, Canadian M-777s and a
British 81 mm mortar team from 42
Commando worked with the OMLT
and the ANA to suppress the new
enemy teams as best they could given
the new circumstances.
“M” Company, 3 RCR eventually
surged into the area and captured
three mortar tubes. One was still
warm after being fired. After these
operations, the bazaar near the FOB
re-opened. In January 2009 the local
merchants told the ANA that they
were not getting the same amount of
business in the “Taliban bazaar” and
preferred the previous arrangements
where they could make real money.
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End Game

S

trongpoint Mushan was clearly
a disruptive element to the
enemy programme for Panjwayi
and Zharey districts as evidenced
by the significant resources, varied
and escalatory methods, and scarce
expertise the insurgents employed in
their attempts to remove the coalition
presence. The willingness of the
Afghan soldiers to continuously exert
a presence in the area, even if it was
limited at times to a three-kilometer
security “bubble,” demonstrated to
the population that the government
was there to stay, even while under
heavy contact over several days. The
question of how to expand that bubble
so that governance and development
activities could expand was not
addressed during that time, given
the security situation. In the Afghan
cultural context of the war, the sort of
obstinacy projected by the defenders
of Strongpoint Mushan can have a
positive effect on the population – if
the message is conveyed properly
by both the defenders themselves
with a PSYOPS team, with CIMIC
quick impact projects, and by the
provincial and national governments
via their methods. Sadly, this level of
coordination does not yet exist within
the Afghan National Army structure
and they remain dependent on the
coalition forces for such support.
As of February 2009, Strongpoint
Mushan continues to hold and
provide a security presence to the
people at the western end of Panjwayi
district.

Notes
1.

A note on sources: The author was
present in the spring and summer of
2008 for the Route Fosters “duel” and
observed it from several levels. During
a research trip to the forward-deployed

2.

3.

4.
5.

elements of the OMLT in the summer
of 2008 I interviewed the personnel
involved in the Mushan operations as
they rotated out of the position. I would
especially like to thank LieutenantColonel Dan Drew, Major Dave Proctor,
Master Warrant Officer Rod Dearing,
and Warrant Officer Chuck Cote for
their insights into OMLT operations
at this time. I would also like to thank
Corporal Tyler Latta, Warrant Officer John
McNabb, and Captain Matt Aggus for
sharing their experiences with me. I also
was briefed by the army aviators from
“Company “B,” 2-17 Cavalry on their role
supporting Canadian and Afghan forces
in Panjwayi district. I would also like
to thank Lieutenant Candice Dunn and
“C” Troop, “B” Battery 1 RCHA. Major
Steve Nolan, Captain Sean French, and
Warrant Officer Joe Doucette from the
follow-on OMLT rotation, assisted me
with the events of late 2008. Note that
certain control measures and intelligence
collection assets have been blurred in
this narrative for operational security
considerations. Some names have been
altered to avoid personal embarrassment.
The Canadian soldiers from 71A asked
me to note that they do not view their
actions at Mushan as extraordinary in
the context of what other elements of the
OMLT were engaged in at the time in
Zharey and Panjwayi districts throughout
2008 and wanted to convey that this is but
one action in the course of their tour in
Afghanistan. They took pains to express
to me their concerns about being labelled
“self-aggrandizing” by others because
their actions appeared in print and other
actions did not. The full story of the
OMLT and its other operations during
that time will be told in a future narrative
so that all OMLT elements receive equal
historical recognition for their efforts.
The Kutchi are nomadic and can be found
throughout Afghanistan. They tend to
live in domed tents and keep camel,
sheep, and donkey herds in addition to
various agrarian pursuits.
At least from this particular rotation.
Those who observed this attack remain
psychologically scarred by it.

Dr. Sean M. Maloney is the historical advisor
to the Chief of the Land Staff. He has
travelled annually to Afghanistan since 2003
to observe coalition operations. He is the
author of several books including Enduring
the Freedom: A Rogue Historian in Afghanistan
(Potomac Books, 2005) and Confronting
the Chaos: A Rogue Historian Returns to
Afghanistan (Naval Institute Press, 2009).
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